Certified Questions from the Federal Courts: Review and Re-proposal by Roth, Larry M.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 34 Number 1 Article 2 
11-1-1979 
Certified Questions from the Federal Courts: Review and Re-
proposal 
Larry M. Roth 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Larry M. Roth, Certified Questions from the Federal Courts: Review and Re-proposal, 34 U. Miami L. Rev. 1 
(1979) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol34/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
university of miami law review
VOLUME 34 NOVEMBER 1979 NUMBER 1
Certified Questions from the Federal Courts:
Review and Re-proposal
LARRY M. ROTH*
In examining the history and intent behind the enactment
of the Florida interjurisdictional certification procedure, the au-
thor points out several salient problems with the process of certi-
fication as it exists today. Delay and additional costs in certify-
ing a question to the Supreme Court of Florida have caused a
hesitancy in the federal courts to certify questions of state law,
thereby defeating the very reasons for the existence of the certifi-
cation process. To remedy these problems, and to promote
federal-state comity while ensuring that state courts remain the
final arbiters on issues of state law, the author suggests the estab-
lishment of a Florida court designed to hear only questions certi-
fied by federal courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1945, the Florida Legislature enacted a statutory procedure
which allowed the federal courts of appeal and the Supreme Court
of the United States to certify questions of state law to the Supreme
Court of Florida.' It permitted certification where an issue of state
* B.S., University of Tennessee, 1973; J.D., University of Florida, 1975. Partner in the
firm of Rutberg and Roth, Casselberry, Florida.
1. 1945 Fla. Laws, ch. 23098, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1977)). The Act
provided
[tihat the Supreme Court of this state may, by rule of court, provide that, when
it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States, to any Circuit Court
of Appeals of the United States, or to the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia, that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or propo-
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law was "determinative of the said cause" and where there were "no
clear controlling precedents" in decisions of the supreme court.
While this legislation was acclaimed as an example of "rare fore-
sight,"2 use of the certification process was another sixteen years in
the future.3 Since that time, however, the federal appellate courts,
primarily the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
have certified a multitude of Florida law questions to the highest
tribunal of the state.'
The system proved highly effective. Both the Fifth Circuit5 and
legal commentators' praised the merits of the certification proce-
dure and encouraged its use. Indeed, the Florida certification pro-
cess had become a viable alternative to federal courts deciding state
law issues. Unfortunately, a flaw developed in the process. The
burgeoning caseload of the Supreme Court of Florida produced
lengthy time delays in the certification process.' As a result, the
sitions of the laws of this state, which are determinative of the said cause, and
there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of
this state, such federal appellate court may certify such questions or propositions
of the laws of this state to the Supreme Court of this state for instructions con-
cerning such questions or propositions of state law, which certificate the Supreme
Court of this state, by written opinion, may answer.
2. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960); Mattis, Certification of Ques-
tions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 717, 717 (1969). Before this statutory process was ever used Professor Philip Kurland
hailed the legislation as a viable example of federal-state cooperation in attempting to bridge
the jurisdictional gap caused by federalism. Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Feder-
alism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489-90 (1960). Since the process
had yet to be used, Professor Kurland was uncertain as to the practical application and
benefit of the certification process. The same year Professor Kurland made his remarks,
however, the Supreme Court stamped its imprimatur on the process in Sun Insurance. There-
after, the door was open to full and frequent use of certification.
3. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961); In re Florida Appellate Rules,
127 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1961); see Kurland, supra note 2, at 489-90.
4. See Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of America, 514 F.2d 704, 705 n.2 (5th Cir.
1975), for an extensive list of cases certified to the Supreme Court of Florida.
5. Id. For a discussion of certification and the lead taken by the Fifth Circuit "in restor-
ing the functional supremacy of the state courts," see Brown, Certification-Federalism in
Action, 7 CuM. L. REv. 455 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the
Florida Supreme Court and its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MiAMI L. REv. 413
(1962); McKusick, Certification: A Procedure for Cooperation Between State and Federal
Courts, 16 ME. L. REv. 33 (1964); Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court,
73 H~Av. L. REv. 1358 (1960); Note, Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification: A Reexami-
nation to Promote Expanded National Use, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 21 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification]; Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Be-
yond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344 (1963).
7. See Note, Supreme Court-Pressures and Priorities, 53 FLA. B.J. 268, 269 (1979);
Report of the Supreme Court Commission on the Florida Appellate Court Structure, 53 FLA.




Fifth Circuit has been reluctant to certify state law questions;' the
certification process has become another statistical victim of the
"ballooning" supreme court docket.'
The Fifth Circuit, of course, has its own docketing problems,
and it may be an untold period of time before that court is in a
position to certify a question initially. Nevertheless, the beneficial
procedures of certification envisioned by the legislature and the
supreme court 0 run the risk of becoming inoperative through the
impractical delays caused by the supreme court. Litigants are
harmed by these delays, and the added costs are becoming prohibi-
tive.
This article briefly explores both the background and develop-
ment of the certification process as well as its present status. From
this analysis, it is proposed that federal court certification should
be preserved and enhanced. To accomplish this, it is submitted
that a new and specialized state tribunal must be established.
II. THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS
A. The Origin of the Process
The 1945 Florida statute established the first state interjuris-
dictional certification procedure." It was not until fifteen years
later, however, that the Supreme Court of the United States, in
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,'" instructed the federal courts
of appeal to use the certifying process. The Supreme Court stated:
[A]s the Court of Appeals indicated, it could not, on the avail-
able materials, make a confident guess how the Florida Supreme
Court would construe the statute. The Florida Legislature, with
rare foresight, has dealt with the problem of authoritatively de-
termining unresolved state law involved in federal litigation by a
statute which permits a federal court to certify such a doubtful
question of state law to the Supreme Court of Florida for its
decision."
8. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 275-76 (5th Cir. 1976),
where the Fifth Circuit stated that the effect of delay was the determinative factor in the
denial of the certification request.
9. For more extensive data on the workload of the supreme court, see England & McMa-
hon, supra note 7, at 445; Note, supra note 7, at 269.
10. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 375-76 (Fla. 1977); FLA. R. APP. P.
9.510.
11. See Kaplan, supra note 6.
12. 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
13. Id. at 212 (citations omitted). It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Frankfurter
authored the majority opinions in Sun Insurance and in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496 (1941), the decision which first developed the abstention doctrine. See text
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Shortly before the certified questions in Sun Insurance were an-
swered, the Supreme Court of Florida promulgated procedural rules
governing the certification process." Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit
began regularly to certify questions to the supreme court.
Surprisingly, only a few states have followed the lead set by
accompanying notes 22-31 infra. Justice Frankfurter was a believer that the state courts
should determine their own legal matters affecting state interests. He maintained that feder-
alism did not sound the death knell for legitimate state interests. In that regard, Justice
Frankfurter closely followed his mentor, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. See generally Frank-
furter, Mr. Justice Holmes, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1279 (1935); Frankfurter, The Early Writings
of 0. W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1931).
14. FiA. R. App. P. 4.61, 127 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1961), provided:
a. When Certified. When it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United
States, or to any of the Courts of Appeal of the United States that there are
involved in any proceeding before it questions or propositions of law of this State
which are determinative of said cause and that there are no clear controlling
precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of this State, such federal
appellate court may certify such questions or propositions of law of this State to
the Supreme Court of Florida for instructions concerning such questions or propo-
sitions of state law.
b. Jurisdiction. Questions or propositions of law referred to in sub-
paragraph (a) hereof shall be certified for answer to the Supreme Court of this
state.
c. Method of Invoking Rule. The provisions of this rule may be invoked by
any of the federal courts referred to in sub-paragraph (a) hereof upon its own
motion or upon the suggestion or motion of any interested party when approved
by such federal court.
d. Contents of Certificate. The certificate provided for herein shall contain
the style of the case, a statement of facts showing the nature of the cause and
the circumstances out of which the questions or propositions of law arise and the
question of law to be answered.
e. Preparation of Certificate. The certificate may be prepared by stipulation
or as directed by such federal court. When prepared and signed by the presiding
judge of said federal court, it shall be certified to the Supreme Court by the clerk
of the federal court and under its official seal. The Supreme Court may, in its
discretion, require the original or copies of all or any portion of the record before
the federal court to be filed with said certificate where, in its opinion, such record
may be necessary in the determination of said cause.
f. Costs of Certificate. The costs of the certificate and filing fee shall be
equally divided between the parties unless otherwise ordered by this Court.
g. Briefs and Argument. The appellant or moving party in the federal court
shall file and serve upon its adversary its brief on the question certified within
thirty days after the filing of said certificate in the appellate court of this State
having jurisdiction. The appellee or responding party in the federal court shall
file and serve upon its adversary its brief within twenty days after the receipt of
appellant's or moving party's brief and a reply brief shall be filed within ten days
thereafter.
h. Oral Argument. Oral argument may be granted upon application and,
unless for good cause shown the time be enlarged by special order of the Court
prior to the hearing thereon, the parties shall be allowed the same time as in other
causes on the merits.
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Florida and have adopted similar statutory schemes.'5 Among the
states within the Fifth Circuit that have adopted certification proce-
dures are Georgia,'" Louisiana'7 and Alabama.'" In addition, both
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit" and the Supreme
Court of the United States" have used the Florida procedures to
certify state law questions to the supreme court.
The eventual rise of certification procedures can be related to
the problems caused by the abstention doctrine.2' The concept of
federal court abstention had its genesis in Railroad Commission v.
Pullman Co., 22 where the Supreme Court of the United States set
forth the principle that when controlling state law was uncertain,
the federal court may hold the case in abeyance, retain jurisdiction
and direct the parties to proceed through state channels to a deci-
sion on the state issues. Abstention sought to give procedural mean-
ing to the doctrine formulated in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins2 which
required federal courts to use applicable state law in deciding issues
of state substantive law. In short, where there are issues of state law
to be decided, the federal court must decide the issue on the basis
of the applicable state law. When there is an issue of state law,
abstention holds the federal action in limbo to permit the litigants
the opportunity to proceed in state court, by declaratory judgment,
15. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390 n.7 (1974) for a list of states which
have made certification procedures available. See also 1A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.203[5], at 2142-43 nn.1 & 2 (2d ed. 1979); Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification, supra
note 6, at 28-29 n.62.
The Mattis article discusses problems with certification that may have caused other
states not to follow the lead set by Florida. They are primarily problems of delay, piecemeal
litigation, impracticality, forum-shopping, advisory opinions and precedential value. See
Mattis, supra note 2, at 725-34.
16. GA. CODE § 24-3902 (1978).
17. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:72.1 (West Supp. 1979).
18. ALA. CONST. art. 6, § 140(b)(3).
19. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated sub noma. Lehman Bros. v.
Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974), on certification, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
20. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75 (1963), on certification, 163 So. 2d 276 (1964); Dresner
v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963), on certification, 164 So. 2d 208 (1964). In Lehman
Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974), the Supreme Court lauded the merits of certification to
the Florida courts, stating that it saves "time, energy, and resources and helps build a
cooperative judicial federalism." Id. at 391 (footnote omitted).
21. For excellent discussions on the principles of abstention, see Agata, Delaney, Diver-
sity and Delay: Abstention or Abdication, 4 Hous. L. REV. 422 (1966); Note, Consequences
of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1358 (1960).
22. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
23. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Chief Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit, in commenting on this
doctrine and the role of the federal judiciary, recently stated that "[iln carrying out our Erie
role that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity actions, the federal judge
must often trade his judicial robes for the garb of a prophet." Brown, supra note 5, at 455
(footnote omitted).
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to secure a determination on that state law issue.
Normally, abstention applies in two types of cases. First, where
a determination of state law will avoid the necessity of having to
decide a federal constitutional issue, the federal court will stay the
action while the parties proceed to the state court for determination
of the unsettled law.2 Second, where a federal decision on state law
will unnecessarily interfere with state regulatory administration and
policy, the federal court will dismiss the case altogether without
retaining jurisdiction.2 Abstention furthers the smooth melding of
federal-state comity; it defers to the judgment of the state court
regarding uncertain state issues. The doctrine, however, has been
severely criticized not only for the divergent results emanating from
its application, but also for its cumbersome procedures which add
delays and costs to the litigation. Many of the litigants are in no
position to bear the added burdens of simultaneous federal-state
court litigation."8 In an effort to assuage these problems, certifica-
tion was initiated to reduce the costs and delays inherent in the
abstention doctrine."
The enactment of section 25.031, the certification statute, by
the Florida Legislature followed close on the heels of the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Meredith v. Winter
Haven." Meredith, which involved a question on the redemption of
municipal bonds, allowed the federal courts to decide a purely state
law issue, holding "abstention" inapplicable even where state court
decisions on issues of statutory and state constitutional law were
uncertain.29 The Meredith case was a reaction to the use of the
24. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941). See genelally
1A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.203[1] (2d ed. 1979), wherein it is stated that "Itihe
Pullman abstention doctrine represents an attempt to accommodate three important princi-
ples: (1) federal courts are obligated to decide cases properly within their jurisdiction; (2)
decision of constitutional issues should be avoided whenever possible; and (3) conflict be-
tween the federal and state systems should be minimized." Id. at 2101-02 (footnotes omitted).
25. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318-32 (1943).
26. See, e.g., Agata, supra note 21, at 442-43; Wright, The Abstention Doctrine
Reconsidered, 37 TEX. L. REV. 815 (1959); Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification, supra
note 6, at 27-28; 1A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.203[5], at 2145-46 (2d ed. 1979).
27. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 375-76 (Fla. 1978). "The certification
process was initiated to eliminate both the expense and delay of abstention, by permitting
the federal litigation to be abated while the doubtful question of state law was referred
directly to the highest state court for resolution." Id. (footnote omitted).
28. 320 U.S. 228 (1943). There are no known recorded reports or hearings with regard to
the legislative history of FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1977).
29. The Meredith case has been held to stand for the proposition that "the mere diffi-
culty in ascertaining local law is no excuse for remitting the parties to a state tribunal for
the start of another lawsuit." Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390 (1974). See Mattis,
supra note 2, at 728-30; Kaplan, supra note 6, at 419. It has been argued that Meredith arose
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abstention doctrine by the federal courts to avoid decisions on
"difficult" state issues. The Florida certification statute was de-
signed to be consistent with the theory behind the abstention doc-
trine and yet not do violence to the Meredith principle.'
B. The Procedures Involved
Section 25.031 of the Florida Statutes"' sets forth the conditions
when a federal court "may" certify a question to the supreme
court.2 There are two criteria: the state issue must be determinative
of the cause, and there must be no clear controlling state precedent.
The deficiencies are obvious.m It is difficult to ascertain when an
issue is determinative, since the state court only answers certified
questions and then returns the case to the federal court for final
disposition." Furthermore, since certification is discretionary on the
part of the federal court, there is no control over when the federal
court believes it is without a "clear controlling" state precedent.3
because the lower federal courts sloughed their constitutional responsibilities and abstained
from deciding on state law merely because the issues involved were difficult. Mattis, supra
note 2, at 728.
30. In his article, Professor Mattis argues that certification does, in fact, violate the
Meredith doctrine by allowing the lower federal courts to use certification to avoid answering
difficult questions of state law. Mattis, supra note 2, at 728-30. He relied on Life Ins. Co. v.
Shifflet, 359 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1966), on certification, 201 So. 2d 715 (Fla.), on receipt of
answers to certification, 380 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1967) and Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe,
344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965) to support that proposition. Although these cases cited may have
been bad applications of the certifying procedures, they do not undermine the theoretical
basis of certification. It must be remembered that Meredith merely complemented the ab-
stention doctrine. Its aim was to cure the abuses of abstention misuse. To that end, certifica-
tion also complements abstention. Therefore, abuse of certification can violate the Meredith
principal, just as abuses of Meredith may also controvert the abstention doctrine.
31. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1977).
32. In light of Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974), it cannot be denied that
the federal court exercises its sound judicial discretion when determining whether or not to
certify a question of state law. Therefore, that determination will not be overturned except
in those limited occasions where there has been an abuse of discretion.
33. See Mattis, supra note 2, at 725-34; Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification, supra
note 6, at 28-29, 33-35.
34. A good example of this problem is Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169
(Fla.), on receipt of answers to certification, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 943 (1964).
35. "Clear controlling" state precedent is the lodestar under § 25.031 as well as FIA. R.
App. P. 9.510(a) and former rule 4.61.
One reason this article proposes the formulation of a Fifth Circuit local rule is to define
more clearly the standards used by that court in certifying a question of state law. Presently,
the Fifth Circuit only determines to certify on the basis of the requirement of FLA. STAT. §
25.-31(1977) and FLA. R. App. P. 9.510. There is no standardized interpretation because the
rule or statute of another state may be interpreted, and each state with a certification proce-
dure may have a differently worded statute or court rule.
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Some writers have suggested that the control comes from the state's
highest court, since they must interpret the state statute and can
accept or reject the certificate."
Either upon motion of one of the parties or of the court sua
sponte, a particular state law issue will be certified.37 The federal
court will request that the parties prepare a stipulation of the facts
and the legal issues to be certified.u If the parties cannot agree, the
court will draft the facts and issues, although this adds to the time
delays."9 The court will usually refer to their boilerplate recital in
advising the parties of the procedure to follow. 0 The question and
the record on appeal are then certified to the Supreme Court of
Florida. Briefing requirements, costs and other procedures are gov-
erned by rule 9.510 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.'
Since the court may decide to certify a question on its own motion, or by motion of either
party, the certification decision is not always met with unanimous consent. In National Educ.
Ass'n v. Lee County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 448 F.2d 451, 452 n.1 (5th Cir. 1971), one of the
parties disagreed with the decision to certify, but this did not dissuade the court from certify-
ing the question.
It seems doubtful whether a court in review would reverse a case based upon the decision
to certify a state law question. An after the fact appeal or certiorari would not be effective to
correct an abuse of discretion, if any. Perhaps the only viable argument in such a certified
question case on review would be that the court erred in not certifying the issue to the state
court. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
36. See Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification, supra note 6, at 29.
37. FLA. R. App. P. 9.510.
38. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 86 (5th Cir. 1962).
39. See Allen v. Estate of Carman, 446 F.2d 1276, 1277 (5th Cir. 1971). In certifying a
question, the Fifth Circuit will point out that the Supreme Court of Florida is not limited to
answering the question according to its precise form and scope. Instead, it has the "widest
discretion" in considering the problem posed by the case. The Florida court can even reformu-
late the question. Id. This provision is aimed at preventing the technical delays between
courts on how to word the question and thus the "ping-pong" effect with regard to the
formulation of the question.
40. A typical example of the procedure is found in National Educ. Ass'n v. Lee County
Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 448 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1971). "Following 'our experience-born practice
we requested that the parties submit a proposed agreed certificate of the issue or issues for
decision.' This they have done. Except for some rearrangement and slight elaboration, the
certificate below tracks or is a paraphrase of the agreed proposal." Id. at 452 (citations
omitted).
41. Rule 9.510 provides as follows:
(a) Applicability. Upon either its own motion or that of a party, the Supreme
Court of the United States or the United States Courts of Apppeals may certify
a question of law to the Supreme Court of Florida whenever the answer is determi-
native of the cause and there is no controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of
Florida.
(b) Certificate. The certificate shall contain the style of the case, a statement
of the facts showing the nature of the cause and the circumstances out of which
the questions of law arise, and the questions of law to be answered. The certificate
shall be prepared as directed by the federal court. It shall be certified to the
Supreme Court of Florida by the clerk of the federal court.
[Vol. 34:1
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C. The Problems Incumbent in the Process
While the theory behind the certification process is valid,"2 the
problems now surrounding the procedure threaten its use and effec-
tiveness. There are essentially two problems: first, there is no estab-
lished formula by which the federal courts decide whether or not to
certify a question; 3 and second, the time delay incumbent in certifi-
cation may preclude its use."
Although the language of section 25.031 and rule 9.510 is clear
in establishing a formula for the federal courts in deciding when to
certify a question to the Supreme Court of Florida, its application
has resulted in uncertainty at the federal level. 5 This is primarily
because certification, even when controlled by an unambiguous
state statute, is discretionary at the federal level." This inevitably
raises questions concerning the propriety of certification. Some fed-
eral courts have attempted to answer difficult questions of unsettled
state law of distant states even though they lack the sensitivity
necessary to act as a state court. 7 If the theory behind the federal
judicial concept is uniformity and coherence in the law where na-
tional interests are supreme, then logically a federal court cannot
don the cloth of the state judiciary to decide an isolated issue of
state statutory or constitutional law. The federal courts are not
guardians of the rights of states. They are not designed for that
purpose, regardless of the geographic provinciality of the federal
(c) Record. The Supreme Court of Florida, in its discretion, may require copies
of all or any portion of the record before the federal court to be filed where the
record may be necessary to the determination of the cause.
(d) Briefs. The brief of the party designated by the federal court as the moving
party shall be served within 20 days of the filing of the certificate. Additional
briefs shall be served as prescribed by Rule 9.210.
(e) Costs. The costs of these proceedings shall be equally divided between the
parties unless otherwise ordered by the court.
For a procedural perspective of the treatment of the problem by the supreme court, see
Insurance Co. of N. America v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 348 So. 2d 1149, 1154 n.12 (Fla.
1977).
42. See generally Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Brown, supra note 5, at
464-65.
43. See United States v. Buras, 475 F.2d 1370, 1375-76 nn.5 & 10 (5th Cir. 1972) (Brown,
C.J., dissenting).
44. See State ex. rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 276 (5th Cir. 1976); Mattis,
supra note 2, at 725-26.
45. See State ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 276-77; Florida's Interjuris-
dictional Certification, supra note 6, at 28-29.
46. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974).
47. "When federal judges in New York attempt to predict uncertain Florida law, they
act . . . as 'outsiders' lacking the common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in
the jurisdiction." Id. at 391.
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judge who makes the decision.'8
The second problem involves what the state court does with the
question once it is certified. This is of particular concern because of
the lengthy time delay which seems inherent in certification."9 In
fact, this problem has become a major factor in the decision of the
Fifth Circuit on whether to certify a question.10 Lengthy delays un-
dermine federal jurisdiction, which is already criticized for its slug-
gish nature. Some cases previously certified took over two years to
be answered;5 this type of delay can only serve to emasculate the
certification process. As previously noted, the cause of this problem




It is submitted that a two-tier plan, which calls for the Fifth
Circuit to act in concert with the Florida Legislature, will remedy
the problems enumerated above.
The Fifth Circuit should amend its local rules by adding a new
rule which essentially tracks the language of section 25.031 and rule
9.510. It should be the announced policy of that court to certify any
state law issue where there is no "clear controlling" precedent.
"Clear controlling" precedent should be defined as any state court
decision which is directly on point or any decision where the highest
state court has definitively addressed the legal issue involved. The
use of other standards, such as "fairly debatable" or "more likely
than not," are too subjective and capricious to warrant reliance.
Such an approach is not constitutionally proscribed, for the
Fifth Circuit would only be establishing a procedural policy. Thus,
there would be no need for a legislative enabling act. The treatment
of certification by the Supreme Court in Sun Insurance53 and
Lehman Brothers5 would seem to resolve any doubts concerning the
48. See generally Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176-77 (1959) Martin v. Creasy, 360
U.S. 219, 228 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
49. See State ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir. 1976); Mattis,
supra note 2, at 725-26.
50. State ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976). As the Fifth Circuit
stated, "we must consider an inevitable side effect of certification-delay. The experience in
our Circuit has been that the process requires a period approaching one year at the
least-sometimes much more . . . . As a result, we belive that delay that is not absolutely
necessary should be avoided." Id. at 275-76 (citations omitted).
51. Allen v. Estate of Carman, 486 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1973) (28 months); Hopkins v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1968) (26 months).
52. See notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
53. 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
54. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
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federal constitutionality of the certification process.
Concurrent with this local rule adoption, the Fifth Circuit
should establish internal procedures whereby a staff attorney would
expeditiously screen all civil cases to make an early determination
of the presence of state law issues. The recommendations of the staff
attorney would then proceed as regularly followed.5 If the appeal
was not set for oral argument, then the new local rule should author-
ize the summary calendar panel" to certify the question if appropri-
ate under the circumstances. Indeed, there is nothing in the certifi-
cation process that is inconsistent with summary calendar disposi-
tion. If an appeal can be expeditiously and judiciously decided
under the aegis of summary calendar by having a question certified
to the Florida courts, then certification would further the aims of
the summary calendar.
In concert with this action by the Fifth Circuit, the Florida
Legislature should amend section 25.031. While this section would
continue to provide for certified questions under the circumstances
currently permitted, the Supreme Court of Florida would no longer
be the arbiter of these questions. Instead, the statute should be
changed to permit the appointment, by the Chief Justice, of a spe-
cial court which shall hear and determine all questions certified
from the federal courts.
The purpose of establishing this judicial body is to render
prompt answers to certified questions. A tribunal designed solely for
certified questions can return answered questions with procedural
quickness and thereby negate the cumbersome delay presently in-
volved in the process of certification.
In furtherance of this proposal, the certification statute should
be expanded to include the federal district courts.57 There is no basis
for prohibiting certification from the district court level. The experi-
ence in the State of Maine discounts that belief.5 A federal district
55. See United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Internal Operating Proce-
dures Manual 15-16 (rev. Oct. 20, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Procedures Manual]; 1 G.
RAHDERT & L. ROTH, APPEALS TO THE FIlTH CIRCUIT MANUAL, ch. 2, at 14-16 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Firm CIRCUIT MANUAL].
56. See Fifth Circuit Local Rule 18.
57. See 1A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.203(5], at 2149-50 & n.21 (2d ed. 1979), where
it is stated that certification should be accomplished as early as possible, even at the district
court level Professor Moore cautions that since certification by district courts will increase
the workload on state courts, the district courts should give "[dlue regard for the interests
of the states in conserving their judicial resources. . . in their use of certification procedure."
Id. at 2150.
58. The Maine certification procedure, modeled after that of Florida, also includes certi-
fication from the federal district courts. See Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification, supra
note 6, at 30.
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court within the Fifth Circuit has already certified a question under
the certification statute of another state." Certification might occur
at summary judgment, post-trial or even upon pretrial stipulated
facts. The litigants and federal trial courts would decide the timing
and format of the certified question. 0
The idea of a special court to hear and decide specified cases is
not new. The United States Temporary Emergency Court of Ap-
peals was established to decide only those appeals related to the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.1 Hence, that court could expe-
ditiously decide appeals without having to grind the decision
through the regular federal appellate millA
2
Florida has experienced this type of proposal. In 1970, an un-
successful attempt was made to amend the constitution to establish
a special appellate court having jurisdiction solely over administra-
tive appeals. 3 These types of special courts and commissions have
received favorable acceptance in foreign countries." In the history
of Anglo-American jurisprudence, there has been a tradition of spe-
cialized courts designed for limited purposes. 5
It is submitted that this new tribunal should consist of seven
judges: two members of the supreme court,6 three district court of
appeal judges and two senior circuit judges. Each member of this
suggested court would be appointed by the Chief Justice to six-year
staggered terms, and each member could be reappointed. 7 Such a
59. Bishop v. Sales, 336 So. 2d 1340 (1976). See Brown, supra note 5, at 462 & n.32 for a
discussion of this case.
60. The overwhelming arguments in favor of applying federal district court certification
to our existing statute are set forth in Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification, supra note
6. One of the principal arguments against district court certification is that it would further
clog the docket of the supreme court. See note 58 supra. This argument is adequately disposed
of by the adoption of a special court designed solely to hear certified questions.
61. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, § 211(b)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976).
62. S. REP. No. 92-507, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [19711 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2283, 2292-93.
63. Levinson, Court of Administrative Appeals: Alternatives Available to Legislature,
Following Defeat of 1970 Proposed Amendment of Judiciary Article of Florida Constitution,
23 U. FLA. L. REV. 261 (1971).
64. Id. at 266-67 & n.33.
65. See generally BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 536-50 (B. Gavit ed. 1941).
66. While it might be said that supreme court justices are already overworked, what is
sought is to have their experience and knowledge on this specialized court. To be sure, the
time of the justices would be better spent by participating in this court than by attending
numerous Florida Bar committees or by touring on the seminar circuit. It is submitted by
the author that judicial energies are best spent on the bench.
67. For the first six years there would be fluctuating lengths of terms in order to initiate
the stagger. In selecting circuit court judges, the Chief Justice would need to remain cognizant
of expiration of terms within the six year period. This time frame is purely arbitrary, but the
length of time was determined with an eye towards longevity and consistency on the court.
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structure would not only bring a wide variety of experience and
perspective to this court from all levels of the Florida judiciary, but
it would also enable the council of jurists to be a body that is repre-
sentative of the interests of the state. Both qualities are indispensa-
ble to a tribunal called upon to decide important questions of state
law.
All the earmarks of a normal justiciable controversy should be
present in the proposed court just as if the question were before the
supreme court. The tenets of res judicata and stare decisis are to
apply to these decisions. Precedents set by the new court should be
binding upon all courts of the state.68 Only the supreme court, when
deciding a controversy before it, could overturn or reject the ratio
decidendi of the new court. Although adoption of this suggested
procedure would vest substantial authority in the new court, it
would not alter the appeal procedure presently available to a party
after a question is certified to the supreme court. Under the present
statute, parties disgruntled with a supreme court answer to a certi-
fied question have no immediate recourse, and neither would the
litigants before this specialized court.
There shall be no direct appeals, writs of certiorari or other
extraordinary procedures from the new court to the Supreme Court
of Florida. Its decision should be final. As a practical matter, the
only instance where a decision may be overturned is where, in a
separate and unrelated case, the supreme court on certiorari would
decide differently than the court of certified questions. To handle
this particular situation, there appears to be no need to revise rule
9.030(a)(2), 9 which deals with certiorari jurisdiction. Provisions of
the rule are adequate to encompass the isolated instances where
68. See generally McGregor v. Provident Trust Co., 119 Fla. 718, 728-34, 162 So. 323,
327-29 (1935); Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735 (1949); Florida's Interjuris-
dictional Certification, supra note 6, at 34-36. It is recommended that the supreme court
revise the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure to include a provision which states that these
decisions of the court shall have the binding effect of law until overturned by supreme court
decision.
69. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2) provides as follows:
(2) Certiorari Jurisdiction. The certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may
be sought to review:
(A) decisions of district courts of appeal that: (i) affect a class of constitutional
or state officers;
(ii) pass upon a question certified to be of great public interest;
(iii) are in direct conflict with a decision of any district court of appeal or
of the Supreme Court on the same point of law;
(B) any interlocutory order passing upon a matter which, upon final judgment,
would be directly reviewable by the Supreme Court;
(C) administrative action, including final orders of commissions established by
general law having statewide jurisdiction.
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certiorari might be accepted.
Revisions and amendments, however, should be made to the
appellate rules to provide briefing schedules and filing procedures
for records and appendices. The amendments could parallel present
rule 9.510. Briefing times should be lessened to speed the process.
These procedural rules should dispense with any copies of the re-
cords of the transferor court and, instead, should require only
"Record Excerpts" as presently used by the Fifth Circuit.70 There
is little need for further documentation since the facts and legal
issues are certified.7 The court would not be bound to grant oral
argument but could, within its discretion, decide the question on
the briefs alone.
Under this plan, all certified questions would be processed
through a newly created division within the office of the clerk of the
supreme court. It may be sufficient to have only one clerk since the
quantity of certified questions has not been voluminous. Oral argu-
ments, perhaps, could be held in Tallahassee at the Supreme Court
Building or in the building that houses the District Court of Appeal,
First District. Oral argument calendars would have to be coordi-
nated with the calendars of the appellate and circuit judges and
with available courthouse space. This is surely a minor problem, one
that has been handled easily by the Temporary Emergency Court
of Appeals.
The proposed court, of course, could not be adopted without
incurring some additional expense. On the whole, the cost should
be relatively small and could be handled by the budgetary requests
of the judiciary. Utilization of existing judges, courthouses and gen-
eral support personnel to handle more expeditiously a workload now
carried by the supreme court seems an efficient reorganization of
current judicial tasks. Only travel and per diem expenses for the
judges, where applicable, and the additional personnel in the office
of the clerk could add to the expense of funding the current system. 2
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED COURT
The feasibility of establishing a court to answer certified ques-
tions is premised on the constitutionality of such a proposed court.
As it affects the local rules of the Fifth Circuit, the proposal would
not have to face a constitutional challenge. Clearly, the frequent use
70. See Procedures Manual, supra note 55, at 10; Fifth Circuit Local Rule 13.1.
71. The full record, of course, is always available, but it would normally not be essential.
72. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 25.231, .241, 112.061 (1977). Reporting of decisions by
the proposed court can be by the practices currently in use. Id. §§ 25.361, .381.
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of the certification process by the Supreme Court of the United
States,73 as well as its resolution of Sun Insurance,7' serve to dispel
any notion of a constitutional prohibition to a Fifth Circuit rule
change. There are, however, three arguments against the establish-
ment of this court: (1) it is a prohibited by article V, section 1 of
the Florida Constitution; (2) it would deny due process; and, (3) it
would deny access to the courts.
At the outset, it should be established that the proposed court
will not intrude upon the jurisdiction of the supreme court as pro-
vided in article V, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. In Sun
Insurance,75 the supreme court stated:
[Wlhile the legislature cannot restrict or take away jurisdiction
conferred by the constitution, constitutional jurisdiction "can be
enlarged by the legislature in all cases where such enlargement
does not result in a diminution of the constitutional jurisdiction
of some other court, or where such enlargement is not forbidden
by the constitution."76
Sun Insurance recognized that since the exercise of certified ques-
tion responses pursuant to section 25.031 was legislatively based,
the legislature could retract or alter the grant just as easily as it
conferred that grant. Because the supreme court in Sun Insurance
found no constitutional prohibition against enlarging its jurisdiction
by vesting certified questions in this court, it follows that the re-
moval of that jurisdiction to our proposed court would be equally
acceptable .77
Article V, section 1 of the Florida Constitution provides that
there shall be four levels of courts, and that no other courts shall
be created.7" On first analysis, this might suggest an inherent con-
flict with the establishment of the proposed court. In fact, however,
this section has not been interpreted as proscribing the creation of
judicial bodies outside of its realm. In addition, it is clear that the
73. See note 20 supra.
74. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
75. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
76. Id. at 742, (quoting Chapman v. Reddick, 41 Fla. 120, 133-34, 25 So. 673, 677 (1899)).
77. It is difficult to see how the proposed court could contravene constitutional jurisdic-
tion when there is nothing in the constitution concerning it in the first place. Furthermore,
"[slince there is no express prohibition against the enactment of section 25.031, a constitu-
tional implication prohibiting the authorization of the statute must be found, in order to
invalidate it." Kaplan, supra note 6, at 426 (emphasis in original).
78. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1 provides that "[tihe judicial power shall be vested in a
supreme court, district courts of appeal, circuit courts and county courts. No other courts may
be established by the state, any political subdivision or any municipality." See, e.g., Sim-
mons v. Faust, 358 So. 2d 1358, 1359 (Fla. 1978)(per curiam).
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spirit and intent of this provision is in conformity with the proposed
court.
The case of Scholastic Systems, Inc. v. LeLoup, 75 and its inter-
pretation of article V, will permit the creation of this special court.
Scholastic Systems stands for the proposition that a judicial body
can exist independently from the constitutional provision relating
to courts.80 In this case, the supreme court held that review of deci-
sions from the Industrial Relations Commission (IRC) was not man-
dated even though the IRC was not a court within the meaning of
article V. To reach that result, the supreme court interpreted IRC
judges as tantamount to circuit court judges and the IRC as equiva-
lent to the district courts of appeal.8 Therefore, the right to an
automatic appeal was satisfied by IRC review of the decision of a
claims judge. Beyond that, review to the supreme court was only
discretionary. In essence, the court established a parallel judicial
hierarchy equivalent to the concept under article V, and it did so
without specifically stating that the IRC was a "court" per se. 2 Two
subsequent opinions of the supreme court have continued to apply
this type of analysis."
Scholastic Systems conferred upon the IRC all the trappings of
being an appellate court, but by raising it to the level of a judicial
body, it was not classified as within the limitations of article V,
section 1. As the court pointed out:
All of these provisions make eminently clear the legislative
intent to elevate the status of the IRC to that of a judicial body
... . The IRC now occupies a position in the structure of our
state government equivalent to the "Article I" courts found in the
federal system. The lack of the word "court" in its title is irrele-
vant; the Board of Tax Appeals was no less a judicial body before
its title was changed to that of "Tax Court of the United
States."8"
79. 307 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1974).
80. The supreme court stated that "[a] body may be a 'court' without being named
within the constitutional article dealing with the judiciary . . . so long as it fulfills the
requirements making it a judicial body of review." Id. at 169.
81. Id. at 170 (citing Pierce v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 279 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1973)).
82. 307 So. 2d at 171.
83. See Meyers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926, 932 (Fla. 1978); Farrell v. Amica Mut. Ins.
Co., 361 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 1978). See generally FLORIDA WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION
PRACTICE 4-5 (2d ed. Oct. 1978 Supp.).
84. 307 So. 2d at 171. The court continued: "Orders of the IRC are not administrative
actions, but are judicial functions in their reviews of workmen's compensation appeals, just
as are appeals to the state district courts which enjoy only certiorari as the principal means
of review in this Court." Id. (emphasis in original).
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This is precisely the position of the proposed court-similar to
the Tax Court or the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals.
Scholastic Systems did not interpret article V, section 1 as a prohi-
bition against this type of specialized court, whether or not it is
labeled a "court."" It should be noted that the intent behind article
V, section 1 was to modernize the Florida judicial system and to
raise the quality of justice being dispensed." In its pre-1972 form,
the constitution permitted the establishment of other courts by the
legislature. 87 The 1972 revision of article V was designed to eliminate
the duplication and ineffectiveness then existing in the judicial
structure. It is this same notion of judicial reform, underlying the
1972 change to article V, which is also the fundamental justification
for the present proposal. The intent is to create a more effective
judicial vehicle by which federal courts can efficaciously ascertain
undetermined issues of state law. As already noted, the delay and
sluggish responsiveness of our present procedure create the threat
that the federal courts will take it upon themselves to decide impor-
tant questions of state law without prior guidance from the state
courts.8 With certification in frequent use, it is less likely that fed-
eral courts will foray into subjective areas of state law and thereby
cause the usual consternation of federal-state conflicting decisions.
A more difficult problem arises when it is alleged that proce-
dural due process 0 is violated by allowing a judicial body, not en-
compassed within article V, to decide legal issues which are deter-
minative in a current controversy. This problem arises by virtue of
classifying the proposed court as a judicial body outside the realm
of article V. Since all litigants have a due process right not to be
bound until they have had their "day in court,"'" the question arises
whether this right is satisfied by the proposed court. Clearly, it is
not sufficient to maintain that due process is satisfied because the
85. It would be unadvisable to label this new court as a commission or agency. To do so
might cause problems with the Administrative Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 120.11-.331
(1977). See generally England & Levinson, Administrative Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 749,755-
56 (1977).
86. See D'Alemberte, Judicial Reform-Now or Never, 46 FLA. B.J. 68 (1972).
87. See Levinson, supra note 63. Prior to the 1972 change, the constitution specifically
allowed the creation of "such other courts ... as the legislature may from time to time ordain
and establish." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1968, amended 1972).
88. See notes 43-53 and accompanying text supra. Under Merdith v. Winter Haven, 320
U.S. at 228, the federal courts could easily subvert valid state interests if no viable alternative
were open to them. See text accompanying notes 29-31, supra.
89. See Brown, supra note 5, at 455-56.
90. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law .. .
91. 10 FLA. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 369 (1979).
19791
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
same procedures are provided as if the question were certified to the
supreme court. Any such analysis misconstrues the nature of the
certification process.
The real answer to this challenge is that litigants in such a case
have not invoked state court jurisdiction. Instead, they are in the
federal arena, and the ultimate decision will be that of the federal
court. The litigants have full due process rights before the federal
court. There is a right to appeal from the district court; there is a
right to direct or discretionary review from the court of appeals to
the supreme court. There is also the opportunity to convince the
certifying court against certification." In sum, the effect at the fed-
eral appellate level is the same for the litigants whether the question
is answered by the Supreme Court of Florida or by the proposed
court. In this regard, it is appropriate to study the remarks of Judge
Jones, concurring in Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. :13
This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject mat-
ter and the power to affirm, reverse or modify the judgment
brought before it for review on appeal. The Supreme Court of
Florida had no jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter.
It had no power to make or enforce any adjudication of the con-
troversy. The cause was not and could not have been adjudicated
by it. It entered no judgment and made no decision. It did not
have before it the parties or the subject matter, except as the
parties voluntarily submitted argument. All that the Florida
court had before it was a question posed by this Court, and all
the Florida court did or undertook to do was to give its answer.
This Court, adopting the Florida court's answer to the question,
affirms the district court's adjudication. The action of the Florida
court was not an adjudication, since only the Federal courts could
enter and enforce judgment. Hence, the action of the Florida
court was not an exercise of a judicial power. It was, so it seems
to me, only the expression of an opinion on the law of Florida by
judges well qualified to give an opinion."
As Judge Jones pointed out, the decision of the state court is
not an adjudication but merely the expression of state law as inter-
preted by the highest court of that state. Since the process of certifi-
cation by the certifying court is discretionary, the acceptance by
that court of the answer of the state court becomes, in effect, the
decision of the certifying court. This avenue of decisionmaking is
92. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976), where
that approach proved successful.
93. 394 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1968).
94. Id. at 658 (Jones, J., concurring).
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infinitely more preferable than an attempt to decide state law based
on what federal courts believe that state courts "would" hold. Need-
less to say, the proposed court must base its answer on a full and
fair consideration of the record before it. Thus, due process will be
satisfied when the certifying court reviews the procedures followed
by the proposed court and determines that its answer was based on
such considerations.
As to the claim that this proposal denies litigants the right of
access to the courts under article I, section 21 of the Florida Consti-
tution, 5 the same arguments are reiterated. The litigants have not
invoked state court jurisdiction, rather they are in the federal courts
where they receive the protections of the Constitution of the United
States. The state court, by answering the question certified, is not
adjudicating; rather, it is rendering an expression on the state law.
In addition, the Supreme Court of Florida has recognized that the
right of access to the courts is not violated when a "reasonable
alternative" is provided to the litigants. In Lasky v. State Farm
Insurance Co., 01 a litigant argued that the Florida no-fault insurance
law, which exempts individuals from tort liability under certain
circumstances, 7 unconstitutionally denied the right of access to the
courts. The supreme court stated that when a reasonable alternative
is provided in place of the traditional action in tort, there is no
violation of the right of access to the courts. 8 In the establishment
of this proposed court, the litigants retain all of the protections
provided in the federal realm; therefore, there is no problem of
denial of access to the courts.
In any event, if it is resolved that the establishment of the
proposed court is inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the
Constitution of the State of Florida, it is recommended that the
constitution be amended to allow for its existence. This could be
accomplished by adding to article V, section 1, the provision that
the legislature could create from time to time "such other courts."
This suggestion leaves open the path for further judicial innovation,
such as the proposals of Professor Levinson," yet is in keeping with
95. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 provides that "[t]he courts shall be open to every person
for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
96. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
97. FLA. STAT. § 627.737(1)-(2) (1977).
98. In Lasky, the reasonable alternative provided a tort plaintiff "[i]n exchange for his
previous right to damages for pain and suffering ... , with recovery limited to those situa-
tions where he can prove that the other party was at fault, . . . [is the assurance] of recovery
of his major and salient economic losses from his own insurer." 296 So. 2d at 14.
99. See Levinson, supra note 63.
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the essential four-tier structure designed to prevent the pre-1972
abuses of judicial organization. 0 Undoubtedly, an attempt to
amend the constitution is not only costly and time-consuming, but
has been shown in marked distrust by voters, at least in the recent
past.'0 ' It is submitted, however, that this approach is unnecessary
inasmuch as the establishment of the proposed court meets all con-
stitutional challenges.
V. OVERVIEW
By making use of the existing facilities and personnel, this pro-
posal presents a sound and practical alternative to federal court
prescience of state law. The cost of this proposal will be relatively
small, but its benefits will ensure preservation of state court integ-
rity. It is in line with current thinking on federal court diversity
jurisdiction. Certification lessens the chance of bad results from
diversity decisions. °2
Even if new supreme court jurisdictional limitations are
adopted, 03 the case load pressure from original jurisdiction, histori-
cal prerogative, and certiorari will not appreciably abate its work
load.'04 A District Court of Appeal has been created for the new Fifth
District. Appellate cases will continue to abound, and recent pro-
posals for our highest court made no allowance for certified ques-
tions from federal courts. 05 In the federal system, recent alterations
can only increase the potential cases ripe for certification. There are
more federal judges now than ever. The forecast, in spite of the
increased numbers of judges, is only for a greater volume of federal
court filings.10a Despite all the arguments to the contrary, Congress
has not'abolished diversity jurisdiction.'0 Problems resulting from
diversity cases helped provide the catalyst for these certification
100. See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
101. See Levinson, supra note 63.
102. An excellent example of the struggle of a federal court with a case of first impression
in state law can be seen in Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1976).
The opinion is fraught with language to the effect that the Fifth Circuit must blindly piece
together clues to determine what the state court would do in this situation. Id. at 771, 776.
Georgia subsequently enacted a certification procedure similar to that of Florida. See note
16 supra.
103. See Report of the Supreme Court Commission on the Florida Appellate Court
Structure, 53 FLA. B.J. 274, 274-95 (1979).
104. England, 1979 Report on the Florida Judiciary, 53 FLA. B.J. 296, 298-99 (1979).
105. Id. See also Borgognoni & Keane, Practice Before the Supreme Court of Florida: A
Practical Analysis, 8 STETSON L. REV. 318, 358-59 (1979).
106. See generally FIFrH CIRCUIT MANUAL, supra note 55, ch. 1, at 22-24.
107. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53-60 (1954) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 139-52 (1973).
[Vol. 34:1
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS
procedures.10 Unless the Supreme Court of Florida expedites certi-
fied questions on the appellate docket, the delays which now
threaten disuse of the process will not substantially diminish. In-
deed, the supreme court cannot justify advanced appellate docket-
ing of cases not arising in the state courts, especially with no assur-
ance that the answers returned will have a guaranteed impact on
the federal litigation. Thus, the need for the creation of this special-
ized court is more compelling today than ever.
This proposal would be a clear and ringing declaration to the
federal courts. It evidences the intent to meet federal court criti-
cisms of the certification system. The bottom line of this proposal
is that federal courts should not decide unclear issues of state law.
This admonition to the federal courts is as old as the Constitution.
On issues of state law, the state courts are the supreme interpreters
within their jurisdictions. 09 Federal courts should not pretend to
have the knowledge of state court prerogatives, and this proposal
would limit any such cavalier approach. It has far greater merit than
the abstention doctrine or even the current certification process.
Moreover, it adheres to the rationale underlying the Erie decision;
in fact, it breathes new life into Erie. While the federal courts have
paid tribute to the principles of Erie, their actions, when deciding
an issue of state law which is unclear, are reminiscent of the era of
Swift v. Tyson, "10 where federal courts subjectively decided issues of
state law."'
The upshot of establishing this proposed court is the restoration
of faith in a judicial system based on federal-state comity. Without
doubt, the suggested alteration of present procedures will enhance
the certification process and hopefully will reverse any current fed-
eral judicial mood disfavoring certification.
108. The enactment of GA. CODE § 24-3902 (1978) on certification was a direct result to
the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir.
1976).
109. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938); Warren, New Light on the History
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923).
110. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Swift held that the word "laws" in the Rules of Decision
Act of 1789 referred only to state statutes and matters of local usage, not to the general
common law of a state. Thus, federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction were free to find
the "true" general common law themselves, regardless of the holding of the state courts upon
the subject. This doctrine was severely criticized and eventually overruled in Erie.
111. See Kaplan, supra note 6, at 414-16. This problem becomes evident when a federal
court makes a "guess" at the state law issue, and than later a state court, when confronted
with the same issue on a state appeal, expressly disagrees with the conclusion reached by the
federal court. See, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131 So. 2d 730, 733-34 (Fla. 1961)
(expressly disapproving Pogue v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957)).
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As a final matter, it is recommended that the specialized court
be entitled "The Court of Certified Questions."
AUTHOR'S NOTE
On November 28, 1979, while in special session, the Florida
Legislature adopted a proposed constitutional amendment to article
V of the Constitution of the State of Florida dealing with the organi-
zation and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida. The
amendment, which will be presented to the electorate of Florida in
March 1980, effectively narrows the supreme court's jurisdiction.
See Florida Bar News, Dec. 15, 1979, at 1, col. 2. Proposed section
3(b) (6) would provide that the court, at its discretion: "May review
a question of law certified by the Supreme Court of the United
States or a United States Court of Appeals which is determinative
of the cause and for which there is no controlling precedent of the
supreme court of Florida."
The author notes that this action makes his proposal all the
more timely, as it presents a viable and practical solution to the
problem of certified questions.
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